







We study an economy where ﬁrms face credit constraints tied to the value of their assets
and ﬁnanciers diﬀer in their information on the market for ﬁrms’ assets. Financiers with poor
information on the asset market make mistakes in asset liquidation, hoarding assets during
booms and trading them during recessions. We ﬁnd that asset liquidity and the composition
-informed versus uninformed- of ﬁrms’ ﬁnanciers breed each other in a cumulative fashion and
that their interaction generates cycles in asset values and output.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the last two decades or so, many countries worldwide, such as the Nordic countries in the early
nineties, Mexico in 1995, Japan and the South East Asian countries in the late nineties, have expe-
rienced unprecedented boom-and-bust cycles. There appear to be two empirical regularities across
most of these episodes. First, the boom-and-bust economies have generally featured large price move-
ments in their asset markets. Second, in the wake of ﬁnancial liberalization, several boom-and-bust
economies have featured a "reshuﬄing" in their ﬁnancial markets, with new ﬁnanciers eroding the
market shares of established ones. For example, in the Nordic countries banks signiﬁcantly expanded
their presence in the real estate sector, while in the South East Asian countries (e.g. Indonesia) for-
eign banks became major players in the local credit markets. In this paper, we show that, when we
account for the possibility that ﬁnanciers have diﬀerent information on the market liquidity of ﬁrms’
assets,1 possibly due to diﬀerent familiarity with the local market, the interaction between the price
of ﬁrms’ assets and the composition -informed versus uninformed- of ﬁrms’ ﬁnanciers may generate
boom-and-bust cycles.
In our economy, ﬁrms face ﬁnancing constraints and their access to credit is tied to the market
value of their assets (as in Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, and a vast literature on ﬁnancial imperfections).
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1The higher the liquidity and, hence, the market price of ﬁrms’ assets, the higher the expected
return that ﬁrms can pledge to ﬁnanciers and the easier their access to credit. The gist of our
analysis consists of the role of asset prices in generating a boom-and-bust output cycle through
their interaction with the composition of ﬁnanciers. Precisely, suppose that a positive shock to the
productivity of assets raises their price. The increase of the asset price relaxes credit constraints
and thereby ampliﬁes the positive output eﬀects of the shock. However, by tilting the composition
of ﬁrms’ ﬁnanciers towards uninformed ones, the increase of the asset price also sows the seeds for
the following recession.
The intuition for this result is as follows. In our economy, ﬁrms can invest in generic projects or in
specialized and more productive ones. Firms can also borrow from ﬁnanciers with deep information
or from ﬁnanciers with poor information on the asset market. Informed ﬁnanciers are eﬃcient asset
sellers: using their information, they resell assets when their price peaks and defer resale when their
p r i c ei so nt h er i s e . I nc o n t r a s t ,u n i n f o r m e dﬁnanciers make "mistakes" and may resell assets too
early or too late. We show that informed ﬁnanciers may be less willing to fund specialized projects
than uninformed ones. In fact, the assets of these projects are speciﬁc to the original ﬁrms and,
hence, intrinsically hard to resell. Thus, the liquidation ability of informed ﬁnanciers goes wasted
under these projects. Furthermore, the reluctance of informed ﬁnanciers to fund specialized projects
is stronger when the asset price is higher. In fact, the higher the price, the higher the liquidation
value that an informed ﬁnancier will give up if she funds a specialized project rather than a generic.
Now, suppose that a positive shock to the productivity of assets raises their price. The increase
of the asset price renders informed ﬁnanciers less willing to fund specialized projects, inducing
more ﬁrms to borrow from uninformed ﬁnanciers. In turn, uninformed ﬁnanciers make mistakes in
timing their asset sales: they hoard assets during the boom, further fostering their price at that
time, and resell them during the recession, further depressing their price. Hence, the change in the
composition of ﬁnanciers exacerbates the volatility of the asset price which, in turn, further tilts the
composition of ﬁnanciers towards uninformed ones. In sum, asset liquidity and price on one side and
the composition of ﬁnanciers on the other breed each other in a cumulative fashion. Furthermore,
since output is positively related to the asset price through credit constraints, the increase in the
volatility of the asset price exacerbates output volatility.
This paper relates to the literature on ﬁnancial imperfections and the business cycle. In this
literature, one of the closest analyses is Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), who show that, through their
eﬀect on credit constraints, changes in asset prices can amplify productivity shocks.2 As stressed by
Matsuyama (2004a), in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) changes in asset prices do not generate business
cycles but the propagation and ampliﬁcation of shocks. Put diﬀerently, a "credit multiplier" but not
a "credit reversal" mechanism is at work. This issue is fundamental. It is commonly argued that
in the boom-and-bust economies the booms endogenously created the conditions for the following
2recessions. Focusing on the ampliﬁcation of shocks, most of the literature on ﬁnancial imperfections
cannot explain a full boom-and-bust cycle.3
There is only a handful of papers in which ﬁnancial imperfections generate instability and ﬂuc-
tuations besides ampliﬁcation and propagation. Matsuyama (2004a and 2004b) are the closest to
our analysis.4 In Matsuyama (2004a), for example, during booms credit ﬂows to "bad" projects,
meant as projects more exposed to credit constraints and that generate less pecuniary externali-
ties. This change in the composition of projects progressively erodes borrowers’ net worth until the
economy peaks and thereafter enters a recession. In Matsuyama (2004a and 2004b), ﬁnanciers are
homogenous and business ﬂuctuations stem from changes in the composition of investment projects.
In our economy, business ﬂuctuations stem from changes in the composition of ﬁnanciers. Clearly,
our explanation and Matsuyama’s may be seen as complementary. Some scholars argue that the
"boom-and-bust economies" suﬀered from a deterioration of the quality of projects during the booms
(see, e.g. Corsetti and Pesenti, 1999). However, other scholars (see, e.g. Radelet and Sachs, 1998)
downplay this argument and claim that, in the wake of ﬁnancial liberalization, during the booms
the most evident pattern consisted of ﬁrms’ tendency to borrow from new ﬁnanciers, such as foreign
investors or investors previously active in other sectors.
This paper also relates to the literature on asset pricing in environments with informed and
uninformed traders. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) develop a model in which noise traders extrapolate
information on the future return of a risky asset from its current price. However, the price contains
imperfect information on future returns. In fact, traders cannot discern whether the price of the
asset is high because the future return will be high or because current asset supply is low. The
behavior of informed (uninformed) ﬁnanciers in our paper mirrors that of informed and uninformed
traders in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). In particular, if the asset price was fully informative, there
would be no diﬀerence between informed and uninformed ﬁnanciers and cycles would not arise.
Thus, this paper may also be thought as an application of the idea of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
to the theory of business cycles.5
The remainder of this analysis is organized as follows. In section 2, we lay out the setup. In
section 3, we solve the model. In section 4, we characterize the equilibrium and show the existence
of cycles. In section 5, we conclude.
2M o d e l S e t u p
T h ee c o n o m yl a s t st w op e r i o d s( t =1 ,2) and each period has a “morning” and an “afternoon”. There
is a unit continuum of entrepreneurs and two unit continua of ﬁnanciers, informed and uninformed.
There are two storable goods, a ﬁnal good and productive assets. Each ﬁnancier is endowed with
one unit of ﬁnal good in each period, while entrepreneurs have no endowment. Entrepreneurs’ utility
3is Ut = ct − cn2/2 while ﬁnanciers’ utility is Ut = ct + ct+1, where c is the consumption of the ﬁnal
good, n ∈ [0,1] is the degree of specialization of the entrepreneur’s project, and cn2/2 is the eﬀort
cost that the entrepreneur sustains to specialize.
The Entrepreneurial Sector.
Morning (Production). In the morning, each entrepreneur can transform one unit of ﬁnal
good into one unit of assets. At the end of the morning, the assets produce with probability
π; otherwise production fails but the assets can be resold. The expected return of a project is
πy(1 + n)+( 1− π)(1 − n) t. (1)
In (1), y(1 + n) is the amount of ﬁnal good produced in case of success: y reﬂects the ability of the
entrepreneur as a primary user of assets and is uniformly distributed over the support [ 1
π, 1
π +1 ] .
 t is instead the amount of ﬁnal good expected from the asset resale, gross of transaction costs. As it
is made clear by (1), specialization yields an output edge yn in case of success. However, it renders
the assets speciﬁc to the original entrepreneur and, hence, less saleable: n t is the amount of ﬁnal
good lost in the resale in the form of a transaction cost.
Afternoon (Liquidation). In the afternoon, each entrepreneur can employ one unit of resold
assets, obtaining instantaneously an amount xφt of ﬁnal good. x reﬂects the idiosyncratic ability
of a second hand user and is uniformly distributed over the support [0,1]. φt reﬂects the aggregate
productivity of second hand users and satisﬁes
φ1 = θ1 + ε, (2)
φ2 = θ2. (3)
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Hence, the economy can experience a recession followed by a boom or a boom followed by a recession.
The Financial Sector. In the morning, each entrepreneur can patronize one ﬁnancier and, after
that, enter a debt contract. We assume that in the negotiation the ﬁnancier has full bargaining
power.
Our economy features limited contract enforceability. First, an entrepreneur can implement
a generic project (n =0 ) or a specialized one (n>0) but she cannot commit to a degree of
4Entrepreneurs patronize financiers
Contracts are written
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Agents consume
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Figure 1: Within Period Time Line.
specialization n. Second, an entrepreneur can divert output from a successful project. The maximum
value of debt an entrepreneur can commit to repay equals
D =( 1− α)y +m i n{ω,(1 − α)yn}. (5)
Thus, the output veriﬁcation technology features a decreasing marginal return to specialization:
when n>ω / y (1 − α), the entrepreneur can commit at most an amount ω of the output edge.
Information Structure. The values of θ1, ε1 and θ2 are realized at the beginning of the relevant
period. Entrepreneurs and informed ﬁnanciers observe them, while uninformed ﬁnanciers do not.
A forward asset market is open at the ﬁnancing stage of each period. In this market, entrepreneurs
buy forward the assets of failed projects and ﬁnanciers sell forward assets contingent on the failure
of funded projects.
2.1 Discussion of the Setup
The assumption that entrepreneurs have a lower discount factor than ﬁnanciers is standard in the
literature on credit imperfections (see e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). This guarantees that entre-
preneurs do not accumulate enough savings to eventually self-ﬁnance their projects. The assumption
that entrepreneurs (ﬁnanciers) are fully impatient (patient) is for simplicity.
In the entrepreneurial sector, the critical feature is that a specialized project yields more output
than a generic in case of success but its assets are less liquid. In our opinion, this eﬀectively
characterizes specialized projects. As for the second use of assets, a simplifying feature is that resold
assets produce instantaneously. Hence, second hand users do not need external ﬁnance to purchase
assets. Gorton and Huang (2004) assume that agents need to ﬁnance purchases of used assets and
endogenize the asset demand, relating it to the aggregate supply of liquidity. Here, we endogenize
the asset supply, relating it to ﬁnanciers’ liquidation decisions.
In the ﬁnancial sector, the assumption that contracts are imperfectly enforceable renders the
choice between informed and uninformed ﬁnanciers meaningful. If output or the degree of special-
5ization were perfectly contractible, uninformed ﬁnanciers would be redundant. In spite of modelling
diﬀerences, our speciﬁcation of the technology and of the ﬁnancial structure shares important fea-
tures with Matsuyama (2004a and 2004b). As in these papers, entrepreneurs choose between a
more productive and a less productive project and the more productive one may be more diﬃcult
to ﬁnance because its expected return is less easy to commit. In Matsuyama (2004a and 2004b)
entrepreneurs may end up investing in the less productive projects. Here, entrepreneurs can fund
more productive projects by addressing uninformed ﬁnanciers (see below). Thus, the heterogeneity
of ﬁnanciers is our novelty.
We ﬁnally turn to the information structure. The notions of "informed" and "uninformed"
ﬁnanciers have several real world counterparts, such as foreign versus domestic ﬁnanciers, ﬁnanciers
with a consolidated experience of the sector versus inexperienced ﬁnanciers, and so forth. The
existence of a forward market for ﬁrm assets implies that their price is publicly observable in the
morning of each period. In practice, in the real world, at each point in time some projects are
ﬁnanced while other projects fail and their assets are resold. Our timing, in conjunction with the
existence of a forward asset market, aims at representing this scenario.
3M o d e l S o l u t i o n
In solving the model, we focus ﬁrst on agents’ decisions taking as given the asset prices p1 and p2
in the two periods. The debt contract speciﬁes the loan, the type of project -generic or specialized-
and the value of debt D due to the ﬁnancier at the end of the morning. It also implies that in
case of project failure the ﬁnancier can repossess assets for a market value up to D.I n t h e ﬁrst
period, she can resell assets in the afternoon or store and resell them in the afternoon of the second
period. Thus, we start by solving for the ﬁrst period decision of a ﬁnancier when to resell assets if
the funded project fails. Then, we solve for the degree of specialization chosen by an entrepreneur
if she implements a specialized project. After that, we solve for the decision of a ﬁnancier whether
to fund a generic project, a specialized one, or not to fund the entrepreneur. Then, we solve for
the decision of an entrepreneur whether to patronize an informed or an uninformed ﬁnancier. After
solving for agents’ decisions and deriving the asset demand and supply in each period, we solve for
the asset prices p1 and p2.
Agents’ Decisions. Consider the decision of a ﬁnancier when to resell assets. The ﬁnancier com-
pares her proceeds in the ﬁrst period with her expected proceeds in the second.6 Formally, let λ
F be
an indicator variable taking on the value of one if a ﬁnancier of type F = I (informed), U (uninformed)






1 if p1 ≥ EF(p2)
0 if p1 <E F(p2)
, (6)
where EF(p2) is the ﬁrst period expectation of p2 conditional on the information of a ﬁnancier of
type F. The reader should keep in mind that, when the resale decision is made, the information set
of an informed ﬁnancier includes the realization of θ1, while that of an uninformed ﬁnancier includes
only the price p1. This will be crucial in the analysis.
Next, we solve for the degree of specialization chosen by an entrepreneur who implements a









Henceforth, we focus on the case in which, for the minimum optimal n, n>ω / y (1 − α).T h i sa l s o
implies n = πy/c: thus, the higher the ability of the entrepreneur, the higher n.
We now turn to the decision of a ﬁnancier whether to fund a generic project, a specialized one, or
not to fund the entrepreneur. Denote V F
g,t (V F
s,t) the period t ﬁnancier’s expected return if a generic
(specialized) project is implemented. Taking into account that n = πy/c, in the ﬁrst period,
V F
g,1 = π(1 − α)y +( 1− π)
h
λ















In the second period, analogous expressions apply, with the diﬀerence that assets are necessarily
resold and the terms in the square parenthesis in (8) and (9) are replaced by p2.
Breaking ties in favor of a generic project, a ﬁnancier of type F will fund a specialized project if
and only if V F
s,t >VF
g,t and V F
s,t ≥ 1. Operating algebraic manipulations, V F
s,1 >VF











In words, a specialized project will be funded if and only if: i) the higher output that the ﬁnancier
obtains from this project (left hand side of (10)) exceeds her loss in terms of the lower asset liquidity
(right hand side of (10)); ii) its expected return does not fall short of the ﬁnancier’s opportunity
cost of funds (V F
s,1 ≥ 1). Analogous conditions hold for a generic project and for the second period.
These conditions are straightforward to derive and we omit them.
We are now in a position to characterize entrepreneurs’ distribution. In what follows, we assume
that, when indiﬀerent, an entrepreneur patronizes an informed ﬁnancier.










of entrepreneurs with y ≥ yt obtain credit; ii) In the ﬁrst period,









entrepreneurs with y ≥ y∗ borrow from uninformed ﬁnanciers. In the second period, all entrepreneurs
borrow from informed ﬁnanciers.
PROOF: Consider ﬁrst point i). The expected return V F
a,t of a ﬁnancier under a specialized
project is monotonically increasing in y. This implies that there exists a value yt such that V F
s,t R 1 for
y R yt. Furthermore, an entrepreneur always chooses a specialized project, if this is feasible. Consider
then point ii). The right hand side of (10) is increasing in y. This implies that there exists a value
y∗ such that for y>(≤)y∗ (10) holds (does not hold). Furthermore, both informed and uninformed
ﬁnanciers have to resell any residual asset in the second period so that no meaningful choice arises
between the two types of ﬁnanciers in the second period.
The impossibility for low-ability entrepreneurs (y<y t) to obtain credit is a standard result
in the literature on ﬁnancial imperfections (for example, see Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). In
fact, low-ability entrepreneurs cannot pledge enough expected returns to ﬁnanciers and cover their
opportunity cost of funds. The result ii) in the lemma is less standard. In our economy, high-ability
entrepreneurs (y ≥ y∗) patronize uninformed ﬁnanciers in the ﬁrst period. The intuition is as follows.
For a given degree of specialization, an informed ﬁnancier expects to obtain a higher value than an
uninformed one from asset resale. Because under a specialized project assets have lower liquidity
than under a generic one, informed ﬁnanciers may be unwilling to fund specialized projects and
thereby waste their liquidation ability. The unwillingness of informed ﬁnanciers to fund specialized
projects is more likely for high-ability entrepreneurs because these have the incentive to specialize
more. Therefore, high-ability entrepreneurs (y ≥ y∗) have to borrow from uninformed ﬁnanciers in
order to implement specialized projects.
Asset Prices. We now turn to the asset market. In each period, in equilibrium, the asset demand
Md





Consider ﬁrst the asset demand. Each entrepreneur with xφt ≥ pt demands one unit of assets.






Consider then the asset supply. In the afternoon of the ﬁrst period, only the assets of the projects
f a i l e di nt h eﬁrst period and not stored are resold. In the afternoon of the second period, the assets
o ft h ep r o j e c t sf a i l e di nt h eﬁrst period and stored between the ﬁrst and the second period are resold
8together with the assets of the projects failed in the second period. Therefore,
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In (13), (1 − π)λ




) is the supply of assets by informed (unin-






the supply of assets that come from projects failed in the second period, while (1−π)(1 −λ
I)(y∗ −





) is the supply of assets that come from projects failed in the ﬁrst
period and have been stored by informed (uninformed) ﬁnanciers. Crucially, in both periods the
asset supply is endogenous and it depends on ﬁnanciers’ resale decisions λ
I and λ
U. In turn, these
decisions hinge on the information possessed by ﬁnanciers in the ﬁrst period.
4 Equilibrium
We now characterize the equilibrium. For a given choice of the structural parameters π, ω, α, and
given realizations θ1,θ 2,ε,the equilibrium is deﬁned by a vector [y1,y 2,y ∗,p 1,p 2,E I(p2), EU(p2),
λ
I, λ
U] such that agents maximize utility and in both periods the credit and the asset markets clear.
Note that, given the speciﬁed process for θ,o n c eθ1 is known θ2 is also known. Furthermore, there
is no aggregate uncertainty in the second period. Hence, for an informed ﬁnancier EI(p2)=p2.
We focus on the boom-recession scenario; the results for the recession-boom scenario are sym-
metric. In proposition 1, we compare the patterns of output and the asset price with those that
would obtain in an economy where informed ﬁnanciers always funded specialized projects. This may
be thought as an economy where entrepreneurs (or a social planner in their place) can discourage
ﬁnanciers from funding generic projects rather than specialized ones. Hence, in this benchmark
economy no entrepreneur would need to borrow from uninformed ﬁnanciers (y∗ =1+1
π).
Proposition 1 Assume that a boom is realized in the ﬁr s tp e r i o df o l l o w e db yar e c e s s i o ni nt h e
second period, that is θ1 = θ
H and θ2 = θ
L. There exists a region of the parameter space such that:
i) In the ﬁrst period, the asset price and output are higher than in the benchmark economy; ii) In
the second period, the asset price and output are lower than in the benchmark economy.
PROOF: In the Appendix.
For example, it can be shown that the proposition holds for the following choice of parameters:
π =0 .75, α =0 .36, ω =0 .095, c =2 , θ =0 .8, θ =0 .3, ε = −0.3. Proposition 1 illustrates the key
result of this paper. In commenting the proposition, we proceed in steps. We start by analyzing
the interaction between asset liquidity and price and the composition of ﬁnanciers (subsection 4.1).
9We then investigate how this interaction may generate output ﬂuctuations (subsection 4.2). After
that, we turn to the informational role of the asset price (subsection 4.3). As discussed previously,
in our economy the equilibrium asset price p1 has a dual eﬀe c t .N o to n l yi tc l e a r st h ea s s e tm a r k e t
in the ﬁrst period, as in any standard Walrasian setting, but it also aﬀects the information set of
uninformed ﬁnanciers by revealing information about the underlying θ1 and, hence, about θ2. In
sum, uninformed ﬁnanciers infer θ2 from the equilibrium p1. Finally, we perform a sensitivity
analysis of the equilibrium, relating the magnitude of the asset price cycle and the output cycle to
the parameters of the model (subsection 4.4).
4.1 Asset Price and the Composition of Financiers
The interaction between the market liquidity of ﬁrms’ assets and the composition -informed versus
uninformed- of ﬁnanciers unfolds as follows. When a boom raises the asset price in the ﬁrst period,
informed ﬁnanciers become less willing to fund specialized projects. This happens because the
higher the price, the higher the liquidation value that an informed ﬁnancier will give up if she funds
a specialized project rather than a generic one. As a result, some high-ability entrepreneurs relocate
their borrowing from informed to uninformed ﬁnanciers in order to invest in specialized projects
(y∗ falls). In turn, this change in the composition of ﬁnanciers aﬀects the intertemporal distribution
o ft h ea s s e ts u p p l ya n dt h ed y n a m i cp a t t e r no ft h ea s s e tp r i c ei nt h ew a yw et u r nt od e s c r i b e .
Uninformed ﬁnanciers make mistakes in timing their resale of assets. When a boom is realized in
the ﬁrst period, followed by a recession in the second, ﬁnanciers should concentrate their asset resale
in the ﬁrst period, when the price is high, without waiting for the second period. Informed ﬁnanciers
correctly anticipate the decline of the price that will occur in the second period. In fact, they observe
θ1 = θ
H,w h i c hi sas u ﬃcient statistic for θ2 = θ
L. Instead, uninformed ﬁnanciers do not observe
the realization of θ1, but only the price p1. Furthermore, as we better argue shortly, p1 is not a
suﬃcient statistic for θ1 and, hence, for θ2. Therefore, uninformed ﬁnanciers may misunderstand a
boom (θ1 = θ
H) for a recession (θ1 = θ
L). If this happens, they will expect that the asset demand
will rise further (θ2 = θ
H) and they will defer their asset resale to the second period. The "mistake"
of uninformed ﬁnanciers depresses the asset supply in the ﬁrst period and fosters it in the second.
In turn, the increase in the volatility of the asset price feeds back on the composition of ﬁnanciers,
further raising the share of uninformed ﬁnanciers in the ﬁrst period. All in all, asset liquidity and
price on one side and the composition of ﬁnanciers on the other breed each other in a cumulative
fashion.
104.2 Output
We now analyze how the described interaction between asset liquidity and price and the composition
of ﬁnanciers aﬀects output. In our economy, the output in period 1 equals
Y1=πA+( 1− π)(B − C), (15)






















In (17) (ϕ1+p1)/2 is the average productivity of a liquidated asset in period 1, while the term in the
square parenthesis is the measure of assets that are liquidated. Finally, C measures the transaction















As for the output in period 2, it is also straightforward to write it as the sum of the output of
successful projects and the output of liquidated assets net of transaction costs, with weights respec-
tively given by the probability of success and failure of the projects. For the sake of brevity, we omit
the relevant expressions, which are available from the authors.
In our economy, all else being equal, the higher the asset price the higher the expected return
that an entrepreneur can pledge to a ﬁnancier. Thus, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) for example,
the share of entrepreneurs 1−yt who have access to the credit market and can invest in projects is an
increasing function of the asset price pt. This implies that when the asset price cycle exacerbates, the
output cycle tends to exacerbate too. Note that an opposite force tends to dampen the comovement
between output and the asset price. When uninformed ﬁnanciers defer the resale of their assets,
they shift the output of these assets from the ﬁrst to the second period. This tends to moderate
output during the boom and to foster it during the recession. This eﬀect is however of second-order
magnitude and is dominated by the direct eﬀect that the asset price has on output through credit
constraints.
4.3 The Informativeness of the Asset Price
The arisal of endogenous cycles hinges on the limited informativeness of the equilibrium price p1.I f
the price was fully informative, informed ﬁnanciers would not diﬀer from uninformed ones. The
11limited informativeness of p1 stems from the randomness of the asset demand. In turn, this is due
to the randomness of the aggregate productivity φ1, as induced by the noise ε1. This feature of our
environment mirrors Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), in which the randomness of the supply of a risky
asset dilutes the informativeness of its equilibrium price.
There is however a second factor that dilutes the informativeness of p1. When a boom is realized
in the ﬁrst period, informed ﬁnanciers resell assets immediately. This fosters the asset supply in the
ﬁrst period, moderating p1. In contrast, when a recession is realized in the ﬁrst period, informed
ﬁnanciers defer resale to the second period. This depresses the asset supply in the ﬁrst period, raising
p1. Therefore, the behavior of informed ﬁnanciers reduces the positive correlation between p1 and
θ1, increasing the probability that uninformed ﬁnanciers misunderstand a boom for a recession and
make mistakes in asset resale.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this sub-section, we perform a sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium. We are interested in the
impact of selected parameters of the model, namely α and π, on the magnitude of the asset price
cycle and the output cycle. α, i.e. the share of output that an entrepreneur cannot pledge to a
ﬁnancier, can reﬂect the eﬃciency of the legal system of the economy: a worse legal system implies
that a higher share α of output can be diverted. The probability of success π of the projects can
instead be thought as a measure of the riskiness of the ﬁrms: the higher π, the lower the riskiness.
We ﬁx the other parameters as follows: ω =0 .095, c =2 , θ =0 .8, θ =0 .3, ε = −0.3.
In ﬁgure 2, we display the percentage drop of output and the asset price between period 1 and
period 2 as a function of α. All else being equal, a higher α fosters the magnitude of both the asset
price and the output drop. Furthermore, α shifts the action from the output cycle to the asset price
cycle. In ﬁgure 3, we display the percentage drop of output and the asset price between period 1
and period 2 as a function of π. All else being equal, a higher π lowers the magnitude of both the
asset price and the output drop. Furthermore, π shifts the action from the asset price cycle to the
output cycle.
We put forward the following interpretation for these ﬁndings. The mechanism that generates
endogenous cycles hinges on ﬂuctuations of the asset price. Both a lower α and a higher π tend to
reduce the relevance of collateral values for ﬁnanciers’ decisions, and hence to erode the importance
of ﬂuctuations in the asset price. When α is lower, pledgeable output constitutes a higher share
of the expected return of a ﬁnancier and correspondingly the collateral value constitutes a smaller
share. Analogously, when the probability π of success of the project is higher, the collateral value
constitutes a smaller share of the expected return of a ﬁnancier. Hence, in both cases the mechanism

























Figure 3: Output and Asset Price Drop: the Eﬀect of π.
135C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have put forward an explanation of boom-and-bust cycles based on the interaction
between the market liquidity of ﬁrms’ assets and the composition of ﬁrms’ ﬁnanciers. The key engine
of this interaction is ﬁnanciers’ heterogenous information on the market liquidity of ﬁrms’ assets.
Recently, some studies have stressed the role that governments have in injecting liquidity in
the asset market during recessions. For example, in Gorton and Huang (2004) the government
steps in to foster the demand for ﬁrms’ assets whenever the private sector is short of funds. This
prevents ineﬃcient ﬁre sales of the assets of distressed ﬁrms. There is however an equally important
role played by governments during recent busts that is largely neglected in the literature. Besides
injecting liquidity, governments have often created institutions, the “Asset Management Companies”,
whose main purpose has been to collect information on the asset market and thereby coordinate
the trade of assets. The Asset Management Companies (e.g. the Swedish Securum) have played a
critical role in identifying the best moments for the liquidation of the assets of distressed ﬁrms, as
well as best users of these assets (Klingebiel, 2000). This paper provides a macroeconomic rationale
for the informational role of Asset Management Companies. Especially in an economy that has
experienced an episode of ﬁnancial liberalization, many ﬁnanciers are unlikely to have accurate
knowledge of the market liquidity of ﬁrms’ assets. This paper suggests that in such an economy
institutions specialized in disseminating information on asset liquidity can be valuable in stabilizing
the economy. A fascinating, though thorny, issue is to gauge quantitatively the stabilizing eﬀect of
this "dissemination of information". We leave this and other issues for future research.
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166A p p e n d i x
SUMMARY OF THE SYSTEM:
The structural parameters must satisfy the following restrictions:
0 <π < 1, (19)
























For a given value of EU(p2), the equilibrium vector of the residual endogenous variables
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(27)
p1 =( θ1 + ε1)
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. Using the Bayes rule
sL =
Pr(p1
¯ ¯ ¯θ1 = θ
H )
Pr(p1
¯ ¯ ¯θ1 = θ
L)+P r ( p1
¯ ¯ ¯θ1 = θ
H )
. (30)
Deﬁne p2H = p2|θ2=θH and p2L = p2|θ2=θL. The equilibrium value of EU(p2) equals
EU(p2)=( 1− sL)p2H + sLp2L. (31)
SOLUTION ALGORITHM:
The algorithm to solve the system (25)-(31) follows these steps:
1. Set θ1 = θ
H and choose a value for ε. Guess a value for λ
U (say λ
U =0 ).
172. Solve the system made by equations (25) to (29). Obtain values for y1,y 2,y∗,p 1 and p2
conditional on the guess λ
U =0 .S e tp2H = p2.
3. Calculate the numerator of sL from the probability density of ε, which gives us Pr(p1
¯ ¯ ¯θ1 = θ
H ).
4. Plug the value of p1 into the system made by (25) to (29) where you now switch the values of
θ1 and θ2.
5. Solve the resulting system for new values of y1,y 2,y ∗,p 2 and for εU (which is now treated as
an endogenous). Set p2L = p2.
6. The probability density of εU gives Pr(p1
¯ ¯ ¯θ1 = θ
L).
7. Using (30), calculate sL.
8. Using (31), calculate EU(p2).
9. Verify that the guess was correct, i.e. indeed EU(p2) >p 1.
18Notes 1The term “liquidity” is used with diﬀerent meanings in the literature. The meaning in this paper, i.e. the market
liquidity of corporate assets, mirrors that in Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Gorton and Huang (2004).
2Iacoviello (2005) develops a model of propagation based on the interaction between house prices and credit
constraints.
3The self-reinforcing nature of booms or busts is also at the center of a few models on liquidity in the ﬁnancial
sector. Focussing on the banking sector, Allen and Gale (2004) study an economy where declines in asset prices force
some banks in liquidation, which in turn further depresses asset prices, in a self-reinforcing fashion. Focussing on
ﬁnancial markets, Bernardo and Welch (2004) construct a model of a “ﬁnancial market run” in which risk neutral
investors liquidate a risky stock for fear of a future liquidity shock.
4Less related to our study, a small literature investigates "boom-and-bust" episodes in open economies by looking
at the build-up of a currency mismatch between ﬁrms’ assets and liabilities. Shneider and Tornell (2003) is the only
study that investigates a full boom-and-bust cycle. In their analysis, during a boom the interaction between credit
constraints and currency mismatch generates ﬁnancial fragility, meant as a scenario in which a small negative shock
can trigger a severe crisis. Diamond and Rajan (2001) build a model in which domestic banks with high liquidation
skills intermediate the short-term funds of foreign investors. The short-term maturity of banks’ liabilities commits
domestic banks to fund illiquid investments, but also generate a mismatch between the maturity of banks’ assets and
liabilities. In turn, this mismatch exposes the economy to a ﬁnancial crisis.
5There is a literature that uses the intuition of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) to explain asset market crises and
contagion. For example, Yuan (2005) presents a model in which informed traders are credit rationed. She shows that
the informativeness of the asset price decreases when the price falls, generating crises and contagion.
6Since a ﬁnancier is endowed with one unit of ﬁnal good in each period, she has no incentive to liquidate immediately
solely in order to accumulate funds and be able to fund a new project in the second period. The same result would
obtain if we allowed ﬁnanciers to borrow from each other.
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